What the OCC's Debanking Report Means for Merchant Underwriting · Midcore Operations
Midcore Operations
Payments & Fintech Advisory

What the OCC's Debanking Report Means for Merchant Underwriting

The OCC found all nine largest banks restricted access by reputation risk, not financial risk, the exact line a merchant underwriting policy has to hold.

Published
15 October 2026
Reading time
9 min read
Author
Payments & Fintech Advisory practice
Topic
Payments & Fintech Advisory
Key takeaways
  • The OCC's supervisory review found that, between 2020 and September 2025, all nine of the largest banks under its supervision had policies that restricted financial access based on reputation risk or industry-specific exclusions unrelated to financial or operational concerns.
  • One of the report's highlighted examples is a payment processor owned by one of the nine banks closing a merchant's account in February 2021 over the products it sold, categorized by the OCC as a reputation risk decision rather than a financial or operational one.
  • On October 14, 2026, the CFPB announced it will investigate whether the banks named in the OCC report, and others, complied with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and UDAAP in their account decisions.
  • The distinction the OCC drew, reputation risk versus financial or operational risk, is the same distinction a merchant underwriting policy has to be able to document for any restricted or prohibited category it maintains.

What the OCC’s debanking report means for merchant underwriting is that the line between a financial risk decision and a reputation risk decision is now the exact line two federal agencies are investigating. That line used to be treated as an internal judgment call. The OCC’s own supervisory review found that every one of the nine largest banks under its supervision had policies restricting account access on reputation grounds rather than financial ones. The CFPB has now opened an investigation into whether that practice violated federal consumer financial law. For an ISO, a PayFac, or any merchant-facing platform that maintains a list of restricted or prohibited business categories, this is not a Washington story happening somewhere else. It is a direct test of how that list was actually built.

What the OCC’s review actually found

Acting under Executive Order 14331, “Guaranteeing Fair Access to Banking for All Americans,” the OCC conducted a supervisory review of debanking activity at the nine largest banks under its supervision. The review covered the period from 2020 through September 2025. Its finding was not that a handful of banks had a handful of problematic policies. It found that all nine of the banks reviewed had policies or practices that denied or restricted financial access. Those restrictions were based on customers’ political or religious beliefs, affiliations, or otherwise lawful business activities, not on any assessment of the customer’s actual financial standing.

The OCC organized its findings into two categories. The first is reputation risk practices: policies that restricted entering or maintaining a customer relationship specifically to manage the bank’s own reputation. The Executive Order does not define that concept, but it generally refers to the risk of adverse economic or brand impact from negative public perception of a particular relationship. The second is industry-specific practices: restrictions on entire sectors for reasons the OCC found were unrelated to actual financial or operational concerns. These ranged from outright prohibitions to escalated, harder-to-clear review requirements. Both categories describe a decision made about a customer’s category. Neither describes a decision made about that customer’s actual financial standing.

The example that lands directly on payments

Most of the report’s highlighted examples describe bank lending or account relationships. One does not. In February 2021, a payment processor owned by one of the nine banks closed the account of a merchant selling merchandise that promoted a political figure and campaign. The OCC categorized this closure the same way it categorized the broader pattern across the nine banks. It was a reputation risk decision. It was not grounded in the merchant’s transaction history, chargeback rate, or any other financial or operational signal.

That example matters to this industry specifically. It describes exactly the kind of decision an ISO, a PayFac, or a sponsoring acquirer makes routinely when evaluating a merchant in a category it considers sensitive. The OCC’s review did not conclude that reviewing sensitive categories is itself the problem. It concluded something narrower: a decision made on reputational grounds, without a financial or operational basis a bank could actually point to, is the specific pattern now drawing federal scrutiny.

What the CFPB added on October 14

The OCC’s report describes what happened. The CFPB’s response describes what happens next. On October 14, 2026, the CFPB announced it will investigate whether the banks identified in the OCC’s report, and other institutions, complied with federal consumer financial law in the account decisions the report describes. The announcement names three specific statutes the CFPB will evaluate compliance against. They are the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s adverse action notice requirements, and the prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.

The CFPB’s announcement is explicit about its jurisdiction here. The agency holds primary supervisory and enforcement authority over banks with more than ten billion dollars in assets. That covers the nine banks named in the OCC’s report directly, along with certain nonbank financial institutions evaluated for the same compliance questions. A review that started as a supervisory finding inside one agency is now an active investigation. It sits inside a second agency with direct enforcement power over the institutions named.

Why this is not just a large-bank problem

It is easy to read a report about the nine largest banks and conclude the exposure stops there. It does not, for one direct reason. The underwriting decisions a sponsor bank, an acquirer, or an ISO makes about merchant categories run on exactly the same logic the OCC just investigated. A merchant risk policy that excludes an entire category of lawful business, not because the category carries a documented financial or chargeback risk but because the category is reputationally uncomfortable, is the same pattern the OCC found at scale among the nine banks it reviewed. The scale is different. The underlying decision is not.

This is also where the CFPB’s choice of statutes matters for this industry specifically. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and its adverse action notice requirements apply to decisions about extending credit and financial services generally, not only to the nine banks named in the report. A sponsor bank or processor that declines a merchant application has to be able to state the actual reason. A stated reason of “we are not comfortable with this category” looks very different under current federal scrutiny than it did a year ago.

A concrete example: the prohibited list nobody re-examined

Picture an ISO with a written prohibited-merchant-category list built four years ago. The sales team wanted a fast answer for prospects that fell into categories that made the company’s own sponsor bank uneasy, so someone wrote down a list and moved on. The list includes firearms retailers, a handful of politically associated merchandise categories, and several industries the sponsor flagged informally as reputationally sensitive during an early conversation that nobody wrote down in detail. Nobody has revisited the list since. Each category sits on it for the same reason. The sponsor bank seemed uncomfortable, not because a specific financial or operational risk was ever documented.

That list, today, is exactly the artifact a sponsor bank’s own compliance team is now under pressure to re-examine. The same question the OCC asked of nine large banks applies to it directly: is each exclusion grounded in an actual financial or operational basis, or is it a reputation-based decision dressed up as a risk category. An ISO that cannot answer that question for its own list is relying on the same justification the OCC’s report just treated as insufficient at the largest banks in the country. The underwriting coordinator who inherited the list four years after it was written has no record of which answer applies to which line.

What a defensible merchant risk policy needs now

The fix is not to stop declining merchants in genuinely high-risk categories. It is to make sure every category restriction can be traced to an actual financial or operational basis. That basis has to be documented well enough to produce on request, rather than resting on an informal sense that a category is uncomfortable. A chargeback rate threshold, a documented fraud pattern specific to a business model, or a card network rule that actually restricts a category are defensible bases. A sponsor’s unstated discomfort, inherited into a policy years ago and never revisited, is not.

That means every prohibited or restricted category on an underwriting policy needs an actual answer to a simple question. What specific financial or operational risk does this category present, and where is that documented. A policy that already has good answers for its real risk categories, like adult content’s elevated chargeback and compliance burden or cannabis’s federal banking restrictions, is in a fundamentally different position than one that cannot separate those answers from categories excluded for reasons closer to the ones the OCC’s report just described.

Running that same test against every line on an existing list is not a quarterly compliance chore to defer. It is the specific exercise the OCC’s report just made urgent, because the test it applied to nine of the largest banks in the country is now the test a sponsor bank’s own examiners have reason to apply to the ISOs and platforms they sponsor. A policy that can answer the question for every category earns a materially different conversation with a sponsor’s compliance team than one that cannot.

Where this connects to the rest of the business

Getting the underwriting file and the policy behind it right, so that every decision has a documented, defensible basis rather than an inherited assumption, is precisely the discipline behind Midcore’s merchant onboarding and underwriting support work, especially for the high-risk and complex merchants where the line this report describes matters most. Choosing or re-evaluating the sponsor bank or processor relationship itself, including how that partner actually documents its own risk categories, is the kind of decision a payments vendor and partner selection engagement is built to support with real diligence rather than an assumption carried over from the last renewal. And for a business that has not looked closely at its own prohibited-category list, or any other policy inherited rather than actively maintained, in several years, a business operations audit is exactly where a gap like this one tends to surface first.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the OCC’s debanking report actually find?

Acting under Executive Order 14331, the OCC conducted a supervisory review of the nine largest banks under its supervision and found that, between 2020 and September 2025, all nine had policies or practices that denied or restricted financial access based on reputation risk management or industry-specific exclusions unrelated to financial or operational concerns, rather than based on an individual customer’s actual creditworthiness or risk profile.

Is there a payments-specific example in the OCC’s findings?

Yes. The report highlights a case from February 2021 in which a payment processor owned by one of the nine banks closed the account of a merchant selling merchandise that promoted a political figure and campaign. The OCC categorized that closure as a reputation risk decision, the same category it found across multiple banks and industries in its broader review.

What is the CFPB doing in response to the OCC’s report?

On October 14, 2026, the CFPB announced it will investigate whether the banks identified in the OCC’s report, and other institutions, complied with federal consumer financial laws in their account decisions, specifically the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s adverse action notice requirements, and prohibitions on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices. The CFPB holds primary supervisory and enforcement authority over banks with more than ten billion dollars in assets.

Sources: OCC, Guaranteeing Fair Banking for All Americans and CFPB, CFPB Announces New Initiative to Address OCC-Uncovered Debanking by Large Banks, October 14, 2026.

Payments & Fintech Advisory practiceMidcore Operations · 15 October 2026
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