Where the Margin in a Card-as-a-Service Program Actually Comes From
The margin in most card-as-a-service programs comes from one regulatory carve-out: which bank holds the account the card debits, and its asset size.

- Regulation II caps a covered debit issuer's interchange at 21 cents plus 5 basis points of the transaction value, plus up to 1 cent more if the issuer meets specific fraud-prevention standards. That cap is the ceiling most large banks are actually stuck under.
- An issuer with less than 10 billion dollars in assets, together with its affiliates, as of the prior calendar year end, is exempt from that cap entirely for accounts it holds itself. This exemption, not a clever product feature, is where most card-as-a-service margin actually originates.
- Regulation II explicitly prohibits circumventing or evading the interchange fee restrictions, and separately bars an issuer from receiving net compensation from a payment card network beyond what it pays that network. Both are real constraints on how aggressively a program can be structured around the exemption.
- Losing exempt status is not instant. An issuer that crosses the 10 billion dollar threshold at a calendar year end has until the following July 1 to begin complying with the capped rate, which is a real planning window a growing program has to track.
Where the margin in a card-as-a-service program actually comes from is a question most vendor pitches answer with product features, rewards tiers, or a slicker onboarding flow. The real answer sits in a single federal regulation. That regulation determines how much interchange the issuing bank is even allowed to collect. The answer depends almost entirely on one fact about the bank itself: how much it has in assets.
The cap that applies to most banks
Regulation II, the Federal Reserve’s implementing rule for the Durbin Amendment, sets a specific ceiling on debit interchange for covered issuers. Section 235.3 states that an issuer complies with the reasonable-and-proportional standard only if each interchange transaction fee it receives or charges for an electronic debit transaction is no more than the sum of 21 cents and 5 basis points multiplied by the value of the transaction. Section 235.4 allows one addition on top of that. An issuer can add up to 1 cent more per transaction, but only if it has developed and implemented policies and procedures reasonably designed to reduce fraudulent electronic debit transactions. Those policies have to address specific requirements around identifying fraud and monitoring its volume and value.
That is the full ceiling available to a covered issuer. A debit card program built on a bank subject to this cap is working within fixed, small-dollar-per-transaction economics. That is true regardless of how the product itself is designed, marketed, or priced to the end cardholder.
The exemption that actually explains the margin
Section 235.5 is where the real story of card-as-a-service economics lives. It exempts an issuer from the interchange fee cap in Sections 235.3, 235.4, and 235.6 entirely, with respect to an electronic debit transaction, if two conditions hold. The issuer has to hold the account that is debited. And the issuer, together with its affiliates, has to have assets of less than 10 billion dollars as of the end of the calendar year preceding the transaction.
That is the entire mechanism. An issuing bank below the 10-billion-dollar threshold is not capped at 21 cents plus 5 basis points at all for accounts it holds directly. This is precisely why card-as-a-service programs are built, almost without exception, on a small, exempt bank as the actual issuer of record rather than on a large national bank. The program manager, the fintech brand, the card design, and the user experience can all look identical across two competing programs. The one built on an exempt issuing bank has access to materially different per-transaction economics than the one built on a covered bank. That difference is the margin a card-as-a-service business is actually selling access to.
Why the exemption is about the bank, not the program
The exemption’s own text is specific about what it is actually measuring. It is the issuer’s own asset size, together with its affiliates. It is not the program’s transaction volume, not the fintech brand’s size, and not how the card is marketed. A card-as-a-service platform processing enormous volume through an exempt issuing bank does not change the fact that the bank itself, the entity that holds the account, is what the rule is testing. This is also why the regulation allows reliance on lists the Federal Reserve Board publishes to determine issuer asset size. Nobody has to independently verify a bank’s balance sheet before every swipe.
That design has a direct consequence for how a card-as-a-service relationship actually has to be structured. The exemption attaches to whichever bank holds the account being debited. A program that routes cardholder funds through an account the exempt bank does not actually hold, or structures the relationship so that a different, larger entity is functionally doing the issuing, is not just taking on operational risk. It is putting the exemption itself in question, because the rule’s condition is specifically about who holds the account, not who markets the card.
The limit most program pitches leave out
Regulation II does not leave the small-issuer exemption as an unlimited structuring opportunity. Section 235.6 states plainly that no person shall circumvent or evade the interchange transaction fee restrictions. It separately prohibits an issuer from receiving net compensation from a payment card network with respect to electronic debit transactions or debit card-related activities within a calendar year, defined specifically as payments or incentives from the network exceeding the fees the issuer pays that network for the same activity.
Both provisions matter directly to how a card-as-a-service deal gets negotiated. The anti-circumvention language means the exemption has to attach to a real issuing relationship, a bank that genuinely holds the account and performs the issuing function, not a structure engineered purely to route interchange through a small bank’s exempt status while the actual program economics and risk sit somewhere else entirely. The net compensation prohibition separately limits how a card network can use side payments or incentive arrangements with the issuing bank to effectively subsidize the program beyond what the interchange economics alone would support. A program manager negotiating economics with an issuing bank and a card network at the same time is operating inside both of these constraints whether or not anyone on the commercial side of the table has read them.
A concrete example: two programs that look identical and are not
Picture two fintechs launching nearly identical debit card programs, same card design, same rewards structure, same target customer. One partners with a community bank holding 2 billion dollars in assets as the issuer of record. The other partners with a bank holding 40 billion dollars in assets. The first program’s issuing bank is exempt under Section 235.5, so the interchange economics on every transaction are not limited to 21 cents plus 5 basis points. The second program’s issuing bank is squarely covered by the cap, meaning every transaction caps out at that same small, fixed ceiling regardless of transaction size.
Over meaningful transaction volume, that single fact, which bank happens to hold the account, is a larger driver of the two programs’ underlying margin than almost any other product decision either team will make. A program manager negotiating a revenue share with the first bank is negotiating over genuinely different economics than one negotiating with the second, and a fintech that does not understand this distinction before signing is negotiating blind on the single largest line item in the entire program’s economics.
What this actually means for structuring a card-as-a-service program
The first diligence question for any card-as-a-service partnership is not the program manager’s platform capabilities or the card network’s brand. It is the actual issuing bank’s asset size, together with its affiliates, as of the relevant calendar year end, and whether that bank genuinely holds the account being debited rather than functioning as a pass-through for a larger entity’s balance sheet. That single fact determines which side of Regulation II’s cap the entire program’s interchange economics sit on.
The second question is a planning one. An issuing bank growing toward the 10-billion-dollar threshold is not a distant hypothetical for a successful program; it is a real trajectory worth modeling explicitly, since the regulation gives a bank that crosses the threshold at a calendar year end until the following July 1 to begin complying with the capped rate. A program built entirely around one exempt bank’s economics needs a real answer for what happens to its margin on that specific date, not an assumption that the bank will simply stay small forever because it is small today.
The third is a structural one: confirming that the issuing relationship is built around a bank genuinely performing the issuing function, holding the account, bearing the associated obligations. The alternative, a structure designed primarily to access the exemption while the real program risk and economics sit with a different, uncapped party, is exactly what Section 235.6’s anti-circumvention language exists to catch. A program that cannot clearly answer who actually holds the account, and why, is building on an exemption that may not hold up to scrutiny. That scrutiny tends to arrive at the worst possible moment, right as the program is growing fastest.
Getting this structure right before a card-as-a-service program launches, not after a growing bank crosses a threshold nobody modeled, is exactly the diligence behind Midcore’s card-as-a-service consulting practice. Where the broader question is which banking structure a platform should build a card program around in the first place, banking-as-a-service consulting is where that foundational decision gets made before a specific issuing bank is even selected. And because the interchange economics behind the cap and the exemption are the real input to any honest revenue model, pricing and revenue modeling is where that number gets built into the business case accurately, rather than assumed from a program manager’s pitch deck.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why do so many card-as-a-service programs specifically partner with small community banks?
Because Regulation II exempts an issuer with less than 10 billion dollars in assets, together with its affiliates, from the interchange fee cap that applies to larger banks. An issuer below that threshold can receive interchange on debit transactions without being limited to 21 cents plus 5 basis points of the transaction value. That exemption, tied specifically to the issuing bank’s own asset size, is the primary source of margin in most debit-based card-as-a-service programs.
Is there a limit on how a card program can be structured around the small-issuer exemption?
Yes. Regulation II Section 235.6 explicitly prohibits circumventing or evading the interchange fee restrictions, and separately prohibits an issuer from receiving net compensation from a payment card network in excess of what it pays that network for debit-related activity. A program built specifically to exploit the exemption without a bank that actually holds the account and bears the issuing function is operating in territory this rule was written to catch.
What actually happens if the sponsor bank in a card program grows past the 10 billion dollar exemption threshold?
It does not lose the exemption immediately. Under Regulation II, an issuer that no longer qualifies for the small-issuer exemption as of a calendar year end must begin complying with the interchange fee cap no later than July 1 of the following calendar year. A card program built on that bank’s exempt status has a real but finite window to plan around a bank’s growth trajectory.
Sources: 12 CFR Part 235, Regulation II (Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing) and the Federal Reserve Board’s own overview of Regulation II.